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CLAUSAL INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 
I. FIXED-POINT SEMANTICS 
L. THORNE MCCARTY 
D Since the advent of Horn-clause logic programming in the mid 1970’s, there 
have been numerous attempts to extend the expressive power of Horn-clause 
logic while preserving some of its attractive computational properties. This 
article, the first of a pair, presents a clausal language that extends Horn- 
clause logic by adding negations and embedded implications to the right- 
hand side of a rule, and interpreting these new rules intuitionistically, in a 
set of partial models. The resulting system is shown to have a fixed-point 
semantics that generalizes the van Emden-Kowalski semantics for Horn 
clauses. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of Horn-clause logic programming in the mid 1970s there have 
been numerous attempts to extend the expressive power of Horn-clause logic while 
preserving some of its attractive computational properties. Many of these efforts 
have focused on negation: Thus, for reasons of computational efficiency, the most 
common extension of Horn-clause logic uses the “negation-as-failure” rule [4], 
although there have been some recent attempts to implement a true negation rule in 
a computationally efficient manner [24]. Another extension, much less common, 
would permit an implication to appear “embedded” as the antecedent of another 
implication: for examples, see [13]. All of these extensions could be translated into 
full first-order logic, of course, with the desired inferences computed using a 
general-purpose theorem prover [2], but experience has shown that such an ap- 
proach would be hopelessly inefficient in many realistic situations. The problem, 
then, is to strike an appropriate balance between expressive power and computa- 
tional tractability. 
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2 L. THORNE M&ARTY 
In this article, we will develop an extended clausal language for logic program- 
ming that permits the appearance of both negations and embedded implications on 
the right-hand side of a rule, and yet preserves some of the computational properties 
of Horn-clause logic. As an example of the kinds of expressions we will analyse, 
consider the following: 
UnownedProperty( x) e= ,OwnActorProperty( y, x), (1) 
UnownedProperty( x) * ,OwnActorProperty( y, x). (2) 
The expression (1) should be read: “If no actor y owns property x, then x is 
unowned property”; and the expression (2) should be read in the same way, but 
with the implication reversed: “If x is unowned property, then no actor y owns 
property x.” Taken together, these two expressions provide a reasonable definition 
of “unowned property.” Note that the free variable y on the right hand side of each 
expression is given an implicit universal quantification, with its scope extending just 
outside of the negation sign, so that the translation of the first expression into 
standard notation would be 
(Vx) [UnownedProperty * (Vy)-,OwnActorProperty( y, x)] 
and the translation of the second expression into standard notation would be 
(Vx) [ UnownedProperty( x) j (Vy),OwnActorProperty( y, x)] . 
When the universal quantifier is written in this way, the connection between 
negations and embedded implications becomes clear. Consider the following exam- 
ples, which were discussed by John McCarthy in [15]: 
SterileContainer( x) * [InsideBugContainer( y, x) * DeadBug( y)] , (3) 
SterileContainer( x) * [InsideBugContainer( y, x) * DeadBug( y )] . (4) 
Using the same conventions as before, the expression (3) should be read: “If every 
bug y inside container x is a dead bug, then x is a sterile container”; and the 
expression (4) should be read: “If x is a sterile container, then every bug y inside 
container x is a dead bug.” Again, the free variable y on the right-hand side of each 
expression is given an implicit universal quantification, with its scope extending just 
outside of the embedded implications, so that the translation of (3) into standard 
notation would be 
(Vx) [SterileContainer( x) * (V_y ) [InsideBugContainer( y, x) 3 DeadBug( y)] 1, 
and the translation of (4) would be: 
(Vx ) [ SterileContainer( x ) = (Vy ) [ InsideBugContainer( y , x) = DeadBug( y )] ] . 
The predicates in these examples are intended to suggest the use of a many-sorted 
language, with basic sorts for actors, properties, bugs, and containers. In fact, 
although we will not develop this point here, our system generalizes easily to such a 
language. 
Now how are we to interpret these expressions, and draw inferences from them? 
Imagine, first, that we live in a world of positive atomic formulae and universally 
quantified Horn rules. We can thus observe particular atomic facts, such as 
OwnActorProperty(Melvin, BlackAcre) and InsideBugContainer(Clyde, PetriDish), 
and we can infer similar atomic facts from the application of the rules. Suppose we 
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want to determine whether or not “BlackAcre” is “unowned property”. Using the 
negation-as-failure rule, we would check every actor and every ownership relation in 
the known world to determine whether any of these actors own Blackacre, and if 
not, we would conclude that “Blackacre is unowned property.” This rule makes 
sense if we can rely on the “closed-world assumption” [22], but otherwise it will lead 
to a fallible inference. In the present article, however, we will assume that our 
observations are neuer complete, and that our view of the world can always be 
augmented by the discovery of new actors, and new bugs, and new relationships 
among them. We thus speciJically reject the closed-world assumption. But if we only 
have partial information about the state of the world, at all times, how can we ever 
conclude with confidence that “BlackAcre is unowned property”? And how can we 
ever conclude with confidence that a particular “PetriDish” is a “SterileContainer”? 
To see the alternative, suppose there is a rule stating that “y owns property x” 
only if “y has registered property x,” and suppose we have been told authoritatively 
by the official registrar that “BlackAcre is unregistered property.” We would then be 
justified in concluding that “no actor y has registered BlackAcre,” and therefore 
“no actor y owns BlackAcre,” and therefore “BlackAcre is unowned property.” In 
this case, no matter how many additional actors turn up in our future observations 
of the state of the world, none of them could own BlackAcre. A similar analysis 
applies in the case of the sterile container. Since we have rejected the closed-world 
assumption, we cannot conclude that a particular Petri dish is sterile simply by 
examining each bug in the dish, one at a time, to see if it is dead. However, if we 
know that bugs are killed by prolonged heating, and if we know that anything inside 
a container is heated whenever the container is heated, and if we know that this 
particular Petri dish has been heated for at least five minutes, then we would be 
justified in concluding that the Petri dish is a sterile container. In this case, no 
matter how many additional bugs turn up in our future observations of the state of 
the world, every bug inside the container must be dead. The general point is this: 
We can draw conclusions about the right-hand side of a rule in the form (1) or (3) 
only if there exist rules in the form (2) or (4) or some equivalent Horn rules, that 
constrain the ways that our initial observation of the state of the world can be 
extended to a more complete state. 
This article will develop the preceding point of view in formal detail, and analyze 
the properties of the resulting system of logic. To define the meaning of the rules 
(l)-(4) we will work with a set of purtial models, each one of which represents a 
possible completion of our initial observation of the state of the world. The result is 
an intuition&tic semantics for negations and embedded implications [14,5], with the 
set of partial models corresponding to the set of possible worlds in a standard 
Kripke model. We will then consider an arbitrary set 9%’ consisting of Horn clauses, 
plus negation rules and embedded implication rules. It is well known [26,1] that 
there exists a simple fixed-point semantics for Horn clauses, and that a set of Horn 
clauses has a unique minimal model. We will show that a similar result holds for a 
set 9 that includes negations and embedded implications, as long as these ad- 
ditional rules are interpreted intuitionisticalll,. In particular, we will construct a 
fixed-point operator for negations and embedded implications (see Theorem 3.7 
below), and we will use this operator to establish the existence of a unique minimal 
model for the set of rules 9 (see Theorem 3.15 below). This appears to be a 
significant result: If the rules (l)-(4) are interpreted classically, it is clear that no 
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such minimal model exists. From a semantic perspective, therefore, our system of 
clausal intuitionistic fogic turns out to be a natural generalization of Horn-clause 
logic. 
To explore this relationship further, we will also investigate in Paper II a 
proposed proof procedure for clausal intuitionistic logic which is itself a natural 
generalization of Horn clause refutation procedures. One consequence of the 
existence of a unique minimal model for a set of rules .%Y is that a query ‘P(X)?’ has 
a definite answer substitution for the variable ‘x’ whenever ‘(3x)P(x)’ is entailed 
by 5%‘. Our proof procedure thus resembles the standard Horn-clause proof proce- 
dure in this respect: It begins with a formula ‘P(x)’ at the top node of a refutation 
tree, and, if it is successful, it concludes by returning an answer substitution for the 
variable ‘x.’ But the refutation tree in our proof appears inside a structure called an 
initial tableau, and whenever the proof procedure encounters a negation rule in the 
form of (l), or an embedded implication rule i% the form of (3), it creates a new 
structure called an auxiliary tableau which contains additional formulae and ad- 
ditional refutation trees. We will show that this procedure is sound (Theorem 4.3) 
and complete (Theorem 4.6) with respect to our fixed point semantics, so that it 
faithfully computes the answers that are entailed by an intuitionistic interpretation 
of the negation and embedded implication rules. Obviously, the proof procedure 
would not be complete if these rules were interpreted classically. 
Although the ultimate goal of this work is to develop a practical proof procedure 
for a system of rules including negations and embedded implications, questions of 
computational complexity are beyond the scope of the present article. Informally 
speaking, our proof procedure is somewhat more complex than Horn-clause proof 
procedures, since it uses a set of refutation trees in place of a single refutation tree; 
but it shares with Horn-clause logic programming a top-down goal-directed search 
strategy, and this suggests the possibility of building an efficient interpreter for our 
language. We will identify in Paper II one situation in which the nondeterminism of 
our proof procedure may lead to serious inefficiencies, and we will propose a 
plausible search heuristic for this case (see Section 4.6). However, our analysis of 
these issues is still incomplete. Thus, any statement about the existence of a 
practical proof procedure for clausal intuitionistic logic should be interpreted as a 
mere conjecture, to be validated or invalidated by subsequent research. 
The idea of using an intuition&tic semantics for the set of rules (l)-(4) was first 
presented, in an abbreviated form, in [16]. That paper was also concerned with a 
broader topic: the relationship between intuitionistic logic and nonmonotonic 
reasoning. This broader topic is beyond the scope of the present article, but it will 
be treated in detail in a forthcoming work [17], which is the complete version of [16]. 
In [16], the construction of a fixed-point semantics for negations and embedded 
implications was outlined briefly, but the full details were not presented. Recently, 
Dale Miller has arrived independently at a similar result [18] using a slightly 
different construction. The work of Dov Gabbay and his colleagues on N-PROLOG 
and QN-PROLOG [6-81 is also closely related. Somewhat more remote, but still 
related, is the work of Peter Patel-Schneider on a decidable variant of first-order 
relevance logic [21]. Underlying all of this research there is a common theme: the 
hope is that we can weaken classical logic just enough to obtain a computationally 
tractable system without sacrificing too much expressive power in the language 
itself. We will discuss this related work in Section 5, which will appear in Paper II. 
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The section of the article immediately following is essentially a review of the 
standard fixed-point semantics for Horn-clause logic programming [26,1], adapted 
slightly to provide the foundation we need to develop the semantics of negations 
and embedded implications. The reader who is familiar with this material could 
easily skim through this section, noting only the points that diverge from the 
standard treatment. Section 3 then develops the semantics for the full set of rules .%‘, 
including the fixed-point results. In Paper II, Section 4 will introduce the proof 
procedures, with examples, and then present the details of the soundness and 
completeness theorems. Finally, Section 6 will outline several extensions of the 
system that are left open for future work. 
2. LOGIC PROGRAMMING IN A SYSTEM OF PARTIAL MODELS 
In this section, we will review the standard fixed-point semantics for Horn-clause 
logic programming due to van Emden and Kowalski [26] and Apt and van Emden 
[l], but with a few minor variations to conform to the ideas developed later in the 
article. The basic position here is that logic programming should be viewed as a 
particular form of computation in a system of partial models. We assume that we 
have been given an initial observation of the state of the world, plus a set of rules 
that the complete state of the world must satisfy, and our task is to compute the 
answer to a query about certain aspects of the world that have not yet been directly 
observed. It will be seen that this is, indeed, a reasonable way to view standard logic 
programming, but more importantly it will turn out that this point of view is 
essential for an understanding of intuitionistic negations and embedded implica- 
tions. In order to incorporate these intuitionistic rules into our system, it is 
necessary to modify slightly the usual interpretation of Horn clauses, but we will 
demonstrate in this section that the standard fixed-point results for Horn-clause 
logic are unaffected by these modifications. In Paper II, these results for Horn 
clauses will then play a crucial role in establishing the soundness (Theorem 4.3) and 
completeness (Theorem 4.6) of the tableau proof procedures for the full system of 
clausal intuitionistic logic. 
We begin by defining the universe of discourse. In standard logic programming, 
this is taken to be the Herbrand universe, and the definition adopted here is almost 
identical. The only difference lies in the treatment of individual constants. An 
individual constant is usually defined as a function of zero arguments, and since the 
set of clauses in a logic program is always finite, this means that there can only be 
finitely many individual constants in the universe. But in our system, based on 
partial models, we imagine that we can always observe a more complete state of the 
world in which new individual constants, but no new function symbols, can appear. 
We must, therefore, make a fundamental distinction between individuals and 
function symbols. Let us then assume that our language consists of the following: 
a denumerable set of individuals: a, b, c, a,, b,, cl,. _ _ ; 
a denumerable set of variables: x, y, z, xi, yi, zi,. . . ; 
a finite set of function symbols: f, g, h, fi, g,, h,, . . . , f,, g,, h,; and 
a finite set of predicate symbols: P, Q, R, P,, Q,, R,, . . . , P,, Q,, R,. 
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The basic definitions are then standard. A term is either an individual, or a variable, 
or an expression f(tl,. . . , f,) where f is a function symbol and each tl,. . . , t, is a 
term. A term that contains no variables is called a ground term. An atomic formula 
is an expression P(tl,. . . , tk) where P is a predicate symbol and each t,, . . . , t, is a 
term. An atomic formula that contains no variables is called a ground atomic 
formula, or sometimes simply a ground instance. Finally, we define U to be the set of 
all ground terms constructible out of the given sets of individuals and function 
symbols, and we define H to be the set of all ground atomic formulae constructible 
from the given set of predicates using only the terms in U. Intuitively, U is the set of 
all possible objects that we can observe in our universe, and H is the set of all 
possible relationships that can hold between these objects. 
Now, in the absence of any further constraints, it is obvious that the complete 
state of the world could be any subset of H. This leads us naturally to a 
consideration of the set of all possible worlds, absent any constraints, which we will 
represent in the usual way by the powerset lattice over H. Formally, let B = .cP(H), 
and consider the complete lattice [B, I] defined on the set B by taking the partial 
order relation ‘ I ’ to be ordinary set inclusion. We will generally refer to the 
elements of B as substates, to suggest that they may only be subsets of the complete 
state of the world, and we will denote them by an italic ‘s’ with or without 
subscripts. We will denote the join of two substates si and s2 by s1 u s2, and we 
will denote the meet by s1 n s2. Since the lattice [B, s] is complete, every set J c B 
will have a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound in B, which we will denote 
by UJ and nJ respectively. Throughout the remainder of this article, we will take 
this basic lattice [B, i] to be fixed. 
In all interesting cases, of course, the set of all possible worlds is subject to 
various constraints, and this leads to a natural notion of inference. We can think 
about this from the point of view of an intelligent agent, roaming around the world, 
making a series of partial observations, and trying to infer the relationships that 
must hold in the complete, but unobserved, state of the world. Assume that the 
agent has been given an initial substate sO, which is nonempty, and a set of rules 5%’ 
that impose constraints on the ways that this initial substate can be extended. (Note 
that sO and 9 will always be finite, for all practical purposes, although it is 
mathematically permissible to consider initial substates and sets of rules that are 
infinite.) The goal of the agent is then to determine which additional relationships it 
will observe in the complete state of the world. A reasonable (but stringent) 
requirement is the following: 
Dejinition 2.1. A ground instance A is entailed by an initial substate s,, and a given 
set of rules 9 if and only if A is a member of every substate s 2 sO that satisfies 
the rules in .%. 
More generally, let P(x) be any atomic formula with predicate P and free 
variables x. It is useful to define two different notions of entailment for the formula 
(-Jx)P(x): 
Dejinition 2.2. The formula (3x)P(x) is entailed by an initial substate sO and a 
given set of rules 9 if and only if, for every substate s 2 sO that satisfies the rules 
in 9, there exists some ground substitution 8 such that P(x)13 E s. 
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Definition 2.3. The formula (3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by an initial substate sO 
and a given set of rules 9 if and only if there exists some ground substitution 8 
such that, for every substate s 2 s,, that satisfies the rules in 9, P(x)0 E S. 
In the second case, of course, the query ‘P(x)?’ will have a definite answer 
substitution for the variables x. We will adopt here the usual conventions for 
substitutions. In particular, we will let 8, I 8, mean that “e, is less specific than 
8 2,” which will be true if and only if there exists a substitution 8 such that 
8, 0 8 = 8,. Also, we will often say that 8 is a ground substitution for the variables x, 
which means that t9 leaves all variables other than x unbound. Note that if 8, and 
8, are both ground substitutions, then we can have e1 s O2 only if all the compo- 
nents of 8, also appear in 8,. 
There is an ambiguity in the preceding definitions that must now be clarified: We 
have not said what it means for a substate s to “satisfy the rules in a.” This will 
depend on the particular form of the rules, and for a set of Horn clauses the 
definition is particularly simple. We will write the rules for Horn clauses in two 
variants, as follows: 
P(x) e Qh; Y) A Q,k Y> A . . . A Q,k Y>, (5) 
p(+Q,(x;~> V Q,(KY> V ... VQ,(x;y>. (6) 
The first rule will be called a conjunctive rule, and abbreviated by P -=/IQ,, and the 
second rule will be called a disjunctive rule, and abbreviated by P -VQ,. These two 
rules together will also be referred to as abstraction rules, since the left-hand side of 
such a rule often represents an abstract predicate and the right-hand side often 
represents the definitional expansion of the predicate. Because of some technical 
details discussed in Paper II (see the proof of Lemma 4.8) it turns out to be 
convenient to require that a predicate P appears at most once on the left-hand side 
of the abstraction rules, and for this reason it is necessary to include disjunctive 
rules P =VQj in the set W. Clearly, the set of rules P =AQ, and P ‘VQ, with 
unique predicates on the left-hand side has the same expressive power as the usual 
set of rules P =AQ, without this restriction. 
The definition of “satisfaction” for the rules P -AQ, and P =VQ, is simple 
because it depends only on a single substate s. Let U(s) be the set of all ground 
terms that are constructible using only the individual constants appearing in the 
substate s. We will adopt the following definitions: 
Dejinition 2.4. The substate s satisfies the conjunctive rule P -AQ, if and only if 
the following condition is true: Let 8 be any ground substitution for the variables 
in P(x) restricted to the terms in U(s). If there exists a ground substitution 8’ 2 B 
such that Q,(x; y)rY E s for all j, then P(x)8 E S. 
The substate s satisfies the disjunctive rule P =VQ, if and only if the 
following condition is true: Let 8 be any ground substitution for the variables in 
P(x) restricted to the terms in U(S). If there exists a ground substitution 8’ 2 8 
such that Qj(x; y)& E s for some j, then P(x)6 E s. 
The reader will note that these are not quite the standard definitions. If every free 
variable x on the left-hand side of the rule also appears on the right-hand side of the 
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rule, then these definitions are logically equivalent o the standard definitions. But 
consider the case of a conjunctive rule P(x) * in which the right-hand side is 
empty. According to the standard definition, P(x)0 would be included in the 
substate s for any ground substitution 8 that binds the variables x to any arbitrary 
terms in U. According to Definition 2.4, P(x)@ would be included in the substate s 
only if 0 binds the variables x to the terms in U(s). Of course, any substate s that 
satisfies the rule P(x)* under the standard definition would also satisfy the rule 
P(x)e under Definition 2.4. The important point, though, is that a substate s can 
satisfy the rule P(x) = according to Definition 2.4 without containing all the ground 
terms that appear in all the possible completions of s. This is consistent with our 
basic philosophy: We are computing in partial models, and we are interpreting the 
rules in 9%’ intuitionistically. We would not, therefore, want to commit ourselves 
to the “truth” of P(x)8 for some 0 that is not yet “known” to “exist” in the 
substate s. 
To analyze this point further, and to establish a connection with the full 
intuitionistic interpretation that will be developed in Section 3, we need to consider 
not just a single substate s that satisfies the rules P eAQj and P =VQj, but also 
the set of all substates that satisfy these rules. For this purpose, the fixed-point 
construction due to van Emden and Kowalski [26] and Apt and van Emden [l] 
provides the appropriate technical machinery. Let us first fix a particular set of rules 
W of the form P = AQj and P eVQj. With these rules fixed, we define an 
abstraction transformation T, from B into B as follows: 
DeJnition 2.5. Let s be a substate in B. Define A E TA(s) if and only if: 
for some conjunctive rule P =AQj and for some ground substitution 8 restricted 
to U(S), A = P(x)@ and Qj(x; y)B ES for all i; or 
for some disjunctive rule P *VQ, and for some ground substitution B restricted 
to U(s), A = P(x)B and Qj(x; y)8 E s for some j. 
We note that TA is monotonic: If si I s2, then TA(sl) I TA(s2). We then use TA 
to construct the set of all substates that satisfy the rules P *AQj and P eVQ,, as 
follows: 
Lemma 2.6. Let G = {s 1 s,, LJ TA(s) I s }. Then G is the set of all substates s 2 sO that 
satisfv the rules P * AQj and P = VQ,. 
PROOF. Obvious, from a comparison of Definition 2.4 with Definition 2.5. 0 
Intuitively, the set G tells us all the possible ways that we can complete the 
description of the world observed at s,, without violating the constraints in P =AQj 
and P =VQj. And G has another important property, as shown by the following: 
Lemma2.7. JCG - I~JEG. 
PROOF. We will actually prove a slightly stronger result. Let T be any monotonic 
transformation from B into B, and let G = {s IT(s) 5 s }. Consider any J c G. By 
the definition of a greatest lower bound, llJ < s for all s E J, and thus, by the 
monotonicity of T, T( ll J) I T(s) for all s E J. Now, by the definition of G, if 
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FIGURE 1. The set of substates that satisfy P =AQj and P -VQ,. 
s E J c G, it follows that 
T( I-lJ) < T(s) IS, 
which means that T( n J) is a lower bound of J. Since ll J is the greatest lower 
bound of J, it follows that T( nJ) I ll J. Thus, by the definition of G again, 
ll J E G. To specialize this result to the present case, we simply take T(s) = s,, u 
TA(S). 0 
This result is generally referred to as the model intersection property for the rules 
P *AQ;l and P *VQj., since it asserts that the intersection of any set of substates 
that sattsfy these rules is itself a substate that satisfies the rules. In particular, if we 
consider the substate g* = nG, it follows from Lemma 2.7 that g* E G. The 
situation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
It is now easy to see that entailment according to Definition 2.2 implies uniform 
entailment according to Definition 2.3 whenever the rules .!Z take the form P * AQ, 
and P =VQj. For suppose that (3x)P(x) is entailed by the initial substate s,, and 
the rules 9. Then, since the substate g* E G satisfies the rules A?‘, there must exist 
some ground substitution 0 such that P(x)0 E g*. However, since g* is also the 
greatest lower bound of G, it follows that P(x)@ E s for all s E G. Thus (3x)P(x) is 
uniformly entailed by so and 9. The critical fact here is the existence of a unique 
minimal substate, namely g*, which includes all the ground instances in the initial 
substate sa and which satisfies all the rules 9%’ in the form P eAQj and P ‘VQ,. 
The substate g* can also be characterized as the least Jixedpoint of the transforma- 
tion T(s) = so U T’(s), by virtue of the following theorem [25]: 
Theorem 2.8 (Knaster-Tarski$xed-point theorem). Let T be a monotonic operator on 
a complete lattice [B, I]. Let P be the set of all fixed points of T. Then P is 
nonempty, and the system [P, I] is itself a complete lattice. In particular, 
UP= U{s(s<T(s)} EP 
np = n {SIT(S) IS} E I? 
In our case, we simply take g* = nG = IlP to obtain the desired result. 
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It will be helpful at this point to summarize these results in a single theorem, 
which is an adaptation of one of the principal theorems in [26]: 
Theorem 2.9 (van Emden and Kowalski). Let s0 be a (possibly infinite) initial substate 
in B. Let 3’ be a (possibly infinite) set of rules of the form P = AQ, and P * VQj, 
and let TA be the transformation associated with 5%’ by DeJnition 2.5. DeJine 
g* = FIG = l-l {slsO U T,(s) I s}. 
Then: 
(1) g* is the unique minimal substate containing s0 that satisfies the rules in W, and 
(2) g* is the least jixed point of the transformation T(s) = sO L. T*(s). 
Notice that we have stated this theorem in two parts. The first part, on the 
existence of a unique minimal substate, depends only on Lemma 2.7 and the model 
intersection property, and it leads to the following corollary: 
Corollary 2.10. If (3x)P(x) is entailed by s0 and .%‘, then (3x)P(x) is uniformly 
entailed by s0 and 9. 
The second part depends on the Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem, but it does 
not play a significant role in our analysis until we come to the proof of the 
completeness theorem for Horn-clause refutation (Theorem 2.14), where the least- 
fixed-point property becomes an essential ingredient in the proof. Even there, it is 
not sufficient for the proof of the completeness theorem that g* is the least fixed 
point of the transformation T(s). For this it is necessary to establish an additional 
property of T: continuity. 
We will say that a transformation T on a complete lattice [B, I] is join-continu- 
ous if, for every ascending chain r0 I rl I r2 I . * * in B, the following equality 
holds: 
T(L_l{r,~k<w})= U{T(r,)Ik<w}. 
The proof that T(s) = se U TA(s) is join-continuous has a few additional steps in the 
present case, but it is otherwise identical to the proof in the standard treatment of 
Horn-clause logic [26,1]: 
Lemma 2. Il. The transformation T(s) = sO U TA( s) is join-continuous. 
PROOF. Let C = { rk 1 k < c.~ } be any ascending chain of substates in B. We need to 
show that T( UC) = U {T(rk) 1 k < a}. The inequality in one direction holds for 
any monotonic T by the following simple argument: For any rk E C, rk I UC and 
therefore T(rk) 2 T( UC). But this means that T( UC) is an upper bound on the set 
{T(r,) 1 k < w }, from which it follows that 
T(UC)k U{T(r,)lk<w}. 
The inequality in the opposite direction holds because of the definition of TA. Let 
A be any ground instance in T( UC) = sO L. TA( UC). If A E sO the inequality 
follows immediately, so assume that A E T,( UC) by virtue of some conjunctive 
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rule P c=AQj. By Definition 2.5, there exists some ground substitution 8 restricted 
to U( Ll C) such that A = P(x)8 and Q,(x; y)8 E UC for a finite number of indices 
j. But since C is just an ascending chain of substates, this means that there must 
exist some substate rk E S such that Q,(x; y)8 E rk for each j. If the ground terms 
in 8 are included in U(r,), then the conditions of Definition 2.5 are satisfied for the 
substate rk, and it follows that A E TA(rk). Otherwise, since there are only a finite 
number of individual constants in 9, and since each of these constants appears in 
some ground atomic formula in UC, there must exist some substate rk+n further up 
the chain such that U( rk+ n ) includes all the ground terms in 6. In this case, the 
conditions of Definition 2.5 are satisfied for the substate rk+n, and it follows that 
/f E G(rk+n ). A similar analysis applies if A E TA( UC) by virtue of some disjunc- 
tive rule P =VQ,. We have thus shown that 
T(UC)< U{T(r,)Ik<o} 
as required. q 
We now consider a sequence of transformations 
empty substate ,0, and we prove the following result: 
Theorem 2.12. g* = U{T”(@) k < a}. 
T,T2,T3 ,..., applied to the 
PROOF. Let C= {Tk(0)Ik<o}, and note that O~T(fl)~T~(t!f)~ ... is an 
ascending chain of substates in B. Thus 
UC= U{T’(O)(k<o} 
= U{T(T”(O))Ik-} 
= T( UC) 
by virtue of Lemma 2.11, which means that UC is a fixed point of T. Since g* is 
the least fixed point of T, we know that g* 2 UC, and we need only show that 
g* 2 UC to complete the proof of the theorem. But clearly g* 20, and thus 
g* = T(g*) L ‘W), and thus by induction g* 2 T“(O) for all k. So it follows 
that g* 2 UC. 0 
We note an immediate corollary: 
Corollary 2.13. If A E g*, then all the individual constants in A appear somewhere in 
the initial substate sO, or in the rules P -hQ, or P -VQ,. 
We will use this fact in Section 4.5 in Paper II. 
It is well known that the equality in Theorem 2.12 leads to a simple constructive 
proof of the completeness theorem for Horn-clause refutation [l]. However, there 
are several possible versions of Horn-clause refutation. We will use And/Or 
refutation trees throughout the present article [19,20], instead of SLD refutation 
trees [l], and this requires us to form the unifying composition of the substitutions 
computed along the branches of the tree [23,3]. The procedure is illustrated in 
Figure 2. In an SLD refutation procedure, which is standard in logic programming, 
the most general unifier u3 would be computed at the tip of the lower left branch of 
this tree, and then applied to the formula ‘Q2.2(x2; y2)u2’ in the lower right branch 
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q-j (x,> 
Ol II 
p, (x,> 
A 
Q1,Jxl; Y,) y Q&1; Y J ol 
02 II 
P,(x,) 
Q&2; ~2) 3 Q&2; ~2) 9 
03 I 04 II 
P,(a) P,(b) 
FIGURE 2. An ‘And/Or’ refutation tree. Answer substitution: q 0 u2 0 (q CIS q). 
of the tree before the final unification with ‘P,(b)’ would be attempted. In an 
And/Or refutation procedure, however, the most general unifiers us and u, would 
be computed separately along each branch, and the answer substitution would then 
be computed by forming the unifying composition, denoted here by ug CB ad, along 
all of the “And” branches. It turns out that And/Or refutation trees are more 
convenient for the analysis of the tableau proof procedures that we will introduce in 
Section 4, but this is not an essential feature of our approach. In fact, In Section 4.6, 
after establishing the soundness and completeness theorems for a tableau proof 
procedure using And/Or refutation trees, we will show how to convert this into a 
tableau proof procedure using SLD refutation trees, if desired. 
We will now state and prove the completeness theorem for Horn-clause refuta- 
tion, assuming that all proofs are constructed from And/Or refutation trees. First, 
some terminology: If a refutation tree for the query P(x) has an answer substitution 
u at its topmost node, we will say that the refutation tree for P(x) is closed with 
answer substitution u. If u is any answer substitution, then the restriction of u to 
the set of variables x will be denoted by u(x). With this notation, we have the 
following result: 
Theorem 2.14 (Completeness). Let sO be a (possibly infinite) initial substate in B, and 
let 9 be a (possibly infinite) set of rules of the form P (= A Qj and P c= V Q,. 
Assume that (3x) P(x) is uniformly entailed by sO and S with ground substitution tl. 
Then there exists a closed refutation tree for P(x) with answer substitution u such 
that U(X) 2 8. 
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PROOF. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.6 in [l]. If (3x)P(x) is 
uniformly entailed by s0 and W with ground substitution 8, then 
P(x)&g*= U{Tk(fl)lk<w} 
by Theorem 2.9 and Theorem 2.12. This means that P(x)19 E Ll {T”@) ] k I n} for 
some finite n. It is therefore sufficient to prove the following proposition: For every 
n <w and for every atomic formula P,,(xO), if PO(xo)B E Ll{Tk(0) 1 k I n} for 
some ground substitution 0, then there exists a closed refutation tree for P,,(x,) with 
an answer substitution u such that a(~,) I 8. 
The proof of the proposition is by induction on n. For the case n = 1, P,(x,)8 E 
T(@ = s,, U T,@). But T,@) = 0 by Definition 2.5, even if there are rules P = in $3 
that have null antecedents. Thus P,,(x,,)B E so. Thus the refutation tree for Po(xo) 
closes immediately with the answer substitution u = 8. 
Now assume that the proposition is true for n, and assume that 
P,,(x,)BE U{Tk(0)lk<n+l} =T(U{Tk(0)lk<n}). 
If pO(xO)e E sO, then u = 8 is again the desired answer substitution. Otherwise, 
Po(xo)@E 7XU{Tk@)lk~~)) d an we can apply Definition 2.5 directly. Assume 
that P,(x&l was generated by a conjunctive rule in the form P =&I,, and note 
that the proof for a rule in the form P = or P =VQ, follows as a special case. By 
Definition 2.5 there exists a ground substitution 0i such that 
p,(x,)fl= PiMe,, 
and 
(7) 
for each j. Since the variables in P,,(x,,) and P,(x,) are distinct, we can rewrite (7) 
as P,,(xo)B 0 8, = P,(x,)8 0 8,, from which it is apparent that Po(xo) and P,(x,) 
have a most general unifier ui I 8 0 0i. We can now verify the following equalities: 
~,,i(xi;~i)fi, = Q,,i(xi;Y,)~~~, 
= Q,,i(xi;~i)e, o ~1 for some ground substitution pi, 
and use them to rewrite the expressions in (8). Applying the induction hypothesis to 
these rewritten expressions, we see that there exists a closed refutation tree for 
Q,,,(x,; y&r, with some answer substitution uj 2 such that uj 2(xo; xi; yi) I pi for 
each j. Since the substitutions uj 2 , have a common instance for their shared 
variables, though, they must also have a unifying composition uz. Thus the refuta- 
tion tree beginning with P,,(x,) closes with an answer substitution u = ui 0 uz. It is 
straightforward to verify that a(~,,) I 8. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.14. 
cl 
Notice the crucial importance of Lemma 2.11 and Theorem 2.12 in this proof: 
Without the continuity of T, established in Lemma 2.11, the first step of the proof 
would not go through. 
For the soundness theorem, it is necessary to introduce a minor qualification, as 
shown by the following example: Suppose s0 = {Q(c)}, and suppose W contains the 
single rule ‘P(x)= .’ Then the refutation tree beginning with ‘P(a)’ would be 
14 L. THORNE MCCARTY 
closed, but ‘P(a)’ would not be entailed by s0 and 9 according to Definition 2.1. 
Similarly, suppose R also contains the rule ‘Q(X) k P(a).’ Then the refutation tree 
beginning with ‘Q(b)’ would be closed, but ‘Q(b)’ would not be entailed by s0 and 
9 according to Definition 2.1. To correct this situation, we will require that the 
individual constants in the query P(x) and the rules W also appear in the initial 
substate so. Note that an analogous requirement is necessary in the standard 
treatment of Horn-clause logic: see [26, p. 7361 and [l, p. 8471. 
We will first prove the following lemma, which is itself a useful form of the 
soundness theorem: 
Lemmu 2.15. Let s0 be u (possibly injinite) initial substate in B, and let 9 be a 
( possibly infinite) set of rules of the form P C= AQ, and P *VP,. Assume that 
there exists u closed refutation tree for P(x) with answer substitution 0. Then for 
every substate s E G that includes the individual constants in P(x) and W, and for 
every ground substitution B for the free variables in P(x)0 restricted to the terms in 
U(S), it follows that P(x)u 0 8 E S. 
PROOF. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1 in [l]. Assume that the 
query P(x) has unified at the top node of the refutation tree with some atomic 
formula Pi(x) from the left-hand side of a rule P *AQ, or P *VQ,, and let o1 be 
the most general unifier at that node. We will say that the depth of this top node is 
0. In general, for an arbitrary node X of depth k > 0, we will assume that a formula 
Q,(x; y)a, that was derived from the right-hand side of a rule P ‘AQ, or P =VQ, 
and a formula Pk+l( x ) f rom the left-hand side of such a rule have a most genera1 
unifier uk + 1 at the node N, and we will assume that the proof has returned an 
answer substitution a;+ 1 to that node. Finally, we will assume that the node at the 
end of the longest branch in the refutation tree has depth n. We will now prove the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2.16. Let Q,-,(x; ~)a,,~, be the formula in a node N of depth n - i in the 
refutation tree, and let a;-,, 1 be the answer substitution returned to N. Then for 
every substate s E G that includes the individual constants in P(x) and 9, and for 
every ground substitution 8 for the free variables in Q, _ ,(x; ~)a,_, 0 u,l_, + 1 re- 
stricted to the terms in U(s), it follows that Q,_,(x; ~)a,-, 0 u,‘_,,~ 0 b’ E s. 
The proof is by induction on i. For the case i = 0, the node Jf of depth n - i 
would be a terminal node, and the formula Q,(x; y)u, would have unified either 
with a ground instance in sO, or with a formula P,I+l(x) from the left-hand side of a 
rule P(x)= with a null antecedent. In either case, the answer substitution u,l+, 
would be identical to the most general unifier u,,+, at the node JY. If the node N 
terminates in a ground instance A E s,,, then Q,,(x; y)u,, * a,, I = A and Proposition 
2.16 follows immediately. On the other hand, if the node JY terminates in a formula 
from the left-hand side of a rule P(x) +, then 
Q,,(x;r)u, oo;,-l = P,z+l(x)u,,+t, 
and Proposition 2.16 follows from Definition 2.4 together with the fact that the 
substate s is a member of G. Note that the substitution u,,+r might very well 
contain some of the individual constants appearing in the query P(x) or the rules 9, 
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but we have stipulated that these constants are also included in s, and thus the 
restriction in Definition 2.4 causes no problems. 
Now assume that Proposition 2.16 has been established for all nodes of depth 
n - i, and consider a node M of depth n - i - 1. If M is a terminal node, then the 
preceding arguments apply directly. Otherwise, the formula Q, _ , _ ,(x; y)u, _ I _ 1 
would have unified with a formula P ,,_,(x) from the left-hand side of a rule 
P -AQ, or P -VQ,, so that 
for some substitution a,,- i. In this case, the node M would be extended to a set of 
nodes { JT } of depth n - i containing the formulae Qj, n _, (x; y) a, _ I along with the 
answer substitutions a,’ n _, + 1, and the answer substitution a,‘_, at node N would be 
equal to the composition of a,,_, with the unifying composition of all the substi- 
tutions ~,‘~-,+i. Suppose now that 8 is any ground substitution for the free 
variables in Q,,_,~l(~;y)u~,,-l~u~~I restricted to the terms in U(s). We need to 
show that Qn~,~l(~;y)u,~,~lOun)~,oB~s, and it is equivalent to show that 
P,, _ ,(x)q_, 0 8 E s. However, since each node 3 satisfies the induction hypothesis 
for some ground substitution 8’ 2 8, it follows that 
for each j, and then by Definition 2.4 it follows that 
P,,_,(x)u,:-, o BE s. 
We have thus established Proposition 2.16 for an arbitrary node X of depth 
n - i - 1, and it follows that the proposition is true for all i. 
For the case i = n, the formula in the node M of depth 0 is simply the query 
P(x), and the answer substitution is u. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.15. q 
We will now convert Lemma 2.15 into a soundness theorem that parallels more 
closely the completeness theorem established above. Assume that the initial substate 
sg includes all the individual constants in P(x) and 9. If P(x)u is a ground atomic 
formula, then Lemma 2.15 tells us that P(x)u E g*. Thus (3x)P(x) is uniformly 
entailed by s0 and 9 with ground substitution u(x). Otherwise, if 8 is any ground 
substitution that binds the free variables in P(x)u to the ground terms in U(g*), 
then Lemma 2.15 tells us that P(x)u 0 8 E g *. Thus (3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed 
by s0 and 9 with ground substitution u(x) 0 8. We will restate this result as follows: 
Theorem 2.17 (Soundness). Let sO he a ( possibly infinite) initial substate in B, and let 
W be a ( possibly infinite) set of rules of the form P = AQ, and P * VQ,. Assume 
that the individual constants in P(x) and 9i’ appear in so, and assume that there 
exists a closed refutation tree for P(x) with answer substitution u. Then (3x)P(x) is 
uniformly entailed b_y sO and 9 with some ground substitution B such that u(x) 5 8. 
Apt and van Emden pointed out in their original paper [l] that the soundness 
and completeness of Horn-clause refutation could, of course, be derived from the 
soundness and completeness of resolution in general, by a simple specialization. But 
the soundness of resolution in general only guarantees that ‘(3x)P(x)’ is true, 
whereas Theorem 2.17 (soundness) tells us that ‘P(x)O’ is true for some ground 
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substitution 8 such that a(x) I 6, and this fact justifies the use of Horn-clause 
refutation as a computational mechanism. A similar point could be made about 
completeness. If we assume that ‘(3x)P(x)’ is true, then Corollary 2.10 to Theorem 
2.9 tells us that ‘P(x)B’ is true for some ground substitution 8, and Theorem 2.14 
(completeness) then tells us that Horn-clause refutation will produce an answer 
substitution u such that a(x) < 0. Again, we obtain more information from these 
two theorems than we do from the completeness of resolution in general. In 
addition, because of the existence of a fixed-point semantics and a continuous 
transformation T, the proof of the completeness theorem for Horn-clause refutation 
is relatively simple. 
Our objective in the remainder of this article is to show that a system of rules 
including negations and embedded implications has some of these same characteris- 
tics, as long as the new rules are interpreted intuitionistically. 
3. NEGATIONS AND EMBEDDED IMPLICATIONS: SEMANTICS 
In this section, we will develop an intuitionistic semantics for a set of rules including 
negations and embedded implications, following the pattern established in Section 
2. It happens that the set G = {s 1 so u &(s) I s}, constructed in Theorem 2.9, is 
itself an intuitionistic model for the rules P eAQj and P =VQj. In Section 3.1, we 
will generalize this fact in a natural way, and define the meaning of the negation and 
embedded implication rules for arbitrary sets J c B. Then, in Section 3.2, we will 
construct a fixed-point operator for these rules, and we will establish the existence 
of a greatest fixed point K* among all the sets J 2 B. The principal theorem here, 
Theorem 3.7, bears a striking resemblance to Theorem 2.9, but a distinction emerges 
upon closer examination: The fixed-point operator for negations and embedded 
implications is not continuous. This fact will cause complications in the proof of the 
completeness theorem in Section 4, but they are not fatal complications, and we will 
close our discussion of the fixed-point semantics for clausal intuitionistic logic with 
a positive result: We will show in Section 3.3 that the set K* possesses the model 
intersection property, just like the set G in the Horn-clause case. Finally, in Section 
3.4, we will discuss three examples that illustrate various aspects of the fixed-point 
theory. In particular, we will discuss the counterexamples that demonstrate that the 
fixed-point operator for negations and embedded implications is noncontinuous. 
3.1. An Intuitionistic Interpretation 
Let us return *to a consideration of the rules (l)-(4), which were analyzed infor- 
mally, for an unowned property and a sterile container, in Section 1. The general 
form for the rules (1) and (2) is the following: 
p(x) e yQ(x; Y> (9) 
P(x) d yQ(x; Y) 00) 
We will call these negation rules and abbreviate them by P C= -,Q and P * 7Q. The 
general form for the rules (3) and (4) is the following: 
J’(x) = [Qk Y> j R(x; ~11 (11) 
P(x) j [Qk Y> j R(x; Y)] (12) 
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We will call these embedded implication rules and abbreviate them by P e [Q * R] 
and P - [Q - R]. We will also refer to the rules (9) and (11) as abstraction rules, 
since the left-hand side of such a rule often represents an abstract predicate, and we 
will refer to the rules (10) and (12) as expansion rules, since the right-hand side of 
such a rule often represents the definitional expansion of a predicate. In all cases, 
the variables y will be given an implicit universal quantification with scope extend- 
ing just outside the right-hand side of the rule. We will rely on the examples in 
Section 1 to convey an informal understanding of the intended interpretation of 
these rules. 
Now how should we formalize this intended interpretation? The key idea, as 
suggested in Section 1, is to imagine all the possible ways that we can complete the 
description of the world observed at sO. If our world is constrained only by rules of 
the form P -AQj and P -VQj, then the set G = {s 1 so LI TA(s) s s} tells us all 
the possible substates s 2 s,,. But suppose our world is also constrained by a rule 
P(x) * --,Q(x;y). This means that a future observation of P(x), for any instantia- 
tion of the variables x, will preclude a subsequent observation of Q(x; y), for any 
instantiation of the variables y. Suppose our world is further constrained by a rule 
P(x) - [Q(x; y) - R(x; y)]. This means that a future observation of P(x), for any 
instantiation of the variables x, will force all subsequent observations of the state of 
the world to be constrained by the rule Q(x; y) * R(x; y). From these considera- 
tions, we see that the set of substates J that satisfies the additional rules P 3 7Q 
and P * [Q - R] is, typically, a proper subset of the set G that satisfies the rules 
P - AQj and P -VQ,. Now consider a negation rule with the reverse implication: 
P(x) (= 7Q(x; y). To apply this rule we have to identify all possible substates that 
satisfy the known constraints on our world, and we have to determine whether 
Q(x; y) is true in any of these substates. If Q(x; y) is not true, in all possible 
substates, for all instantiations of the variables y, then the rule tell us that P(x) 
must itself be true. A similar analysis applies to the rule P(x) = [Q(x; y) - R(x; y)]. 
In this case, we must determine whether the embedded implication Q(x; y) +. R(x; y) 
on the right-hand side is true in all possible substates that satisfy the known 
constraints on our world. It is obvious, however, that there is a potential interaction 
between these two kinds of rules. The rules P - 7Q and P - [Q - R] might 
restrict the set J of possible substates, which might then trigger the right-hand side 
of some of the rules P-=,Q and P-[Q * R], which might then trigger further 
rules of the form P - 7Q and P * [Q - R], and so on. To avoid this problem, we 
need to find the largest set J c B that satisfies all the rules simultaneously, if such a 
set exists. These considerations thus lead naturally to the construction of a fixed-point 
semantics for negations and embedded implications. 
With this motivation, we can now proceed to the formal definitions. Let U(s) be 
the set of all ground terms that are constructible using only the individual constants 
appearing in the substate s. Let J be any subset of B. We first define the meaning of 
the negation rules P * 7 Q and P - 7Q relative to the set J, as follows: 
DeJinition 3.1. The substate s E J satisfies the negation rule P e 7Q if and only if 
the following condition is true: Let 0 be any ground substitution for the variables 
in P(x) restricted to the terms in U(s). If Q(x; y)e’ P s’ for all S’ 2 s in J and for 
all ground substitutions 8’ 2 8, then P(x)8 E S. 
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The substate s E J satisfies the negation rule P * 7Q if and only if the following 
condition is true: Let 8 be any ground substitution for the variables in P(x) 
restricted to the terms in U(s). If P(x)0 E s, then Q(x; y)O’ E s’ for all s’ 2 s in J 
and for all ground substitutions 8’ 2 8. 
Similarly, we define the meaning of the embedded implication rules P -[Q * R] 
and P * [Q - R] as follows: 
DeJnition 3.2. The substate s E J satisfies the embedded implication rule P -[Q 3 
R] if and only if the following condition is true: Let I3 be any ground substitution 
for the variables in P(x) restricted to the terms in U(s). If Q(x; y)B' ES’ * 
R(x; y)8’ E s’ for all s’ 2 s in J and for all ground substitutions 8’ 2 0 restricted 
to the terms in U(s’), then P(x)0 E s. 
The substate s E J satisfies the embedded implication rule P => [Q * R] if and 
only if the following condition is true: Let t9 be any ground substitution for the 
variables in P(x) restricted to the terms in U(s). If P(x)0 E s, then Q(x; y)e’ E s’ 
3 R(x; y)B’ ES’ for all s’ 2 s in J and for all ground substitutions 8 2 8 
restricted to the terms in U(s’). 
Although these definitions are relativized to an arbitrary set J c B, we will now 
say that a set J itself satisfies one of these rules if every substate s E J satisfies the 
rule according to the preceding definitions. Note that any such set J is essentially a 
Kripke model for the given rule, and thus our interpretation is an intuitionistic 
interpretation [14,5] of the rules (9)-(12). 
Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 are given here for the most general forms of the negation 
and embedded implication rules, but we can simplify these rules in certain cases. It 
is convenient to separate the rules into two groups: the expansion rules P - 7Q 
and P - [Q * R], and the abstraction rules P e-,Q and P = [Q * R]. We note, 
first, that the expansion rule P 3 [Q = R] is equivalent to the Horn clause R - P A 
Q, in the following sense: 
Lemma 3.3. The set J c B satisjies the expansion rule 
P(x) * [Qk Y> * R(x; Y)] 
if and only if every substate s E J satisjies the Horn clause 
R(x;y)-P(x) A Q(x;Y>. 
PROOF. Obvious, from a comparison of Definition 2.4 with Definition 3.2. 0 
We can thus simplify our system by dropping all rules in the form P = [Q =;) R], 
and working only with the expansion rules P - 7Q_ Later, in Section 4.6, in a 
discussion of the possible variations in our proof procedures, we will show how to 
add the expansion rules P 3 [Q * R] back to the proofs, if desired. 
Now consider the abstraction rules P = -,Q and P -[Q * R]. We can simplify 
the form of the abstraction rules P * [Q * R] by assuming that all the variables x 
and y that appear in R(x; y) also appear in Q(x; y). To see this, suppose there is a 
rule 
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that violates this assumption. We can then replace this rule with the rule 
P(xi;xz)* [Q’(x,;x,;y,;yz) *&;x,;Y,;Y,)], 
plus the two Horn clauses 
Q’(x,; x z;~i;~z)=Q(x,;~,)> 
Q’(x+z;Y~:Yz) ==, Q(~,;Y,)$ 
where the new formula Q’(x,; xz; yi; y2) is identical to the formula Q(x,; yi) except 
that the predicate Q’ has additional arguments for the variables x2 and y2. From an 
inspection of Definition 2.4 and Definition 3.2, it is easy to see that these two 
systems of rules are equivalent. Similarly, we may assume that the variables x on the 
left-hand side of the abstraction rules P e -Q and P*[Q-R] also appear on 
the right-hand side of these rules. These assumptions will simplify the analysis of the 
proof procedures that will be introduced in Paper II, to appear in the upcoming 
June issue. We note one consequence immediately: If, for every rule P e [Q * R], 
the y variables in R(x; y) also appear in Q(x; y), then it becomes superfluous in 
Definition 3.2 to restrict the substitution 8’ to the terms in U(s’). We will thus 
assume in our subsequent analysis that this restriction has been eliminated. 
3.2. Fixed-Point Semantics 
We will now consider a set of rules 5%’ that includes Horn clauses in the form 
P -AQ, and P -VQ,, expansion rules in the form P * 7Q, and abstraction rules 
in the form P e7Q and P c= [Q * R]. Our task is to construct a fixed-point 
semantics for these rules. 
We will work with the expansion rules first. It is clear from Definition 3.1 that 
some sets J c B will satisfy the rules P =. -Q, and some will not, and we obviously 
want to consider only those sets J that do satisfy the given rules. As an analytical 
device, then, let us construct the (much larger) lattice [9(B), ~1, using the symbols 
U and fl for the join and the meet, and also for the least upper bound and the 
greatest lower bound. We can then establish the following result: 
Lemma 3.4. The set of all sets J z G that satisb the negation rules P 3 7Q has a 
largest element in [P(B), ~1, which we will denote by Jo. 
PROOF. Define 
J,=U{J(JcGandJsatisfiesallrules Pa,Q}. 
It is obvious that J,, c G, and thus we need only show that Jo satisfies the rules 
P * -,Q. Let s be any substate in Jo, and select one of the negation rules 
P(x) j 7Q(x; y) for consideration. Assume P(x)0 E s for some 0 restricted to U(s), 
and consider any s’ E Jo such that s’ 2 s. By the definition of Jo, s’ E J for some 
J c G that satisfies all the negation rules P =. 7Q, and since P(x)0 E s’, it follows 
that Q(x; y)8’ P s’ for all 8’ 2 8. Thus Jo satisfies the selected negation rule P * 7Q 
at s. Since the substate s and the rule P(x) =) 7Q(x; y) were arbitrary, however, we 
conclude that J,, satisfies all rules in the form P 2 7Q. Clearly Jo is the largest 
subset of G for which this is true. 0 
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This means that we need only consider the single set JO in our subsequent 
analysis of the rules P - YQ, since every set that satisfies these rules will be 
contained in J,,. 
The analysis of the abstraction rules P = -Q and P - [Q * R] is slightly more 
complicated, but here we can mimic the approach taken in the Horn-clause case. Let 
us define a transformation TN from P(B) into 9(B) as follows: 
DeJinition 3.5. Let J be a subset of B. Define s E TN(J) if and only if s E J and for 
every ground instance A such that 
for some negation rule P - YQ and for some ground substitution 0 for the 
variables in P(x) restricted to the terms in U(s), A = P(x)@ and Q(x; y)e’ @ s’ 
for all s’ 2 s in J and for all ground substitutions 8’ 2 8, or 
for some embedded implication rule P * [Q * R ] and for some ground substitu- 
tion 0 for the variables in P(x) restricted to the terms in U(s), A = P(x)t3 and 
Q(x; y)e’ E s’ 3 R(x; y)e’ E s’ for all s’ 2 s in J and for all ground substitu- 
tions 8’ 2 8, 
it follows that A E s. 
Although this definition may seem complex, the idea is actually very simple. 
Basically, TN is a deletion operator: It examines the set J above the substate s to 
see if the right-hand side of any of the rules P e YQ or P .z= [Q - R] is satisfied, 
and, if so, it deletes the substate s unless the left-hand side of each of these rules is 
also satisfied. We can then show the following: 
Lemma 3.6. TN is a monotonic transformation from 9(B) into 9(B). 
PROOF. Assume J, G J2, and select any substate s E TN(J1). By Definition 3.5, 
s E J,, and thus s E J2, and if we can show that the remaining conditions of 
Definition 3.5 are satisfied as well, we will be able to show that s E T,(J,). Suppose 
there is a negation rule P(x) c= --,Q(x; y) an a d g round substitution 8 restricted to 
U(s) such that Q(x; y)rY P s’ for all s’ 2 s in J2 and for all 8’ 2 8. Then the same 
condition will hold for all s’ 2 s in J,. Since s E TN(J1), though, it must be the case 
that P(x)0 E s. Since this same argument applies to any rule P -ye or P -[Q * R] 
involved in Definition 3.5, it follows that s E TN(J2). We have thus shown that 
TN&) C TdJd. q 
Since we now have a monotonic transformation on the complete lattice [9(B), c 1, 
we can apply the Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem [25] directly to construct a 
complete lattice of fixed points in [g(B), ~1. In this case, we will be interested in 
the greatest fixed point, rather than the least fixed point, but otherwise the 
correspondence to the fixed-point semantics of van Emden and Kowalski [26] and 
Apt and van Emden [l] is very close. In particular, the following theorem is closely 
analogous to Theorem 2.9: 
Theorem 3.7. Let sO be a ( possibly injinite) initial substate in B, and let 9 be a 
(possibly infinite) set of rules including negations and embedded implications. Let 
JO E P(B) be the largest set of substates s 2 s,, that satis-es the rules P = AQ,, 
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P -VQ,, and P * 7Q. Let TN be the transformation associated with the rules 
P C= 7Q and P * [Q =j R] by Definition 3.5. Define 
K* = U{JIJ c T,(J) n J,,}. 
Then: 
(1) K* is the largest set of substates s 2 sO that satis-es all the rules in 9, and 
(2) K* is the greatest fixedpoint of the transformation T(J) = TN(J) n J,,. 
PROOF. Set K* = U{J ] J c T(J)} = UP in Theorem 2.8. Then K* is the greatest fixed 
point of the transformation T(J) = TN(J) n Jo. In other words, K* = T,(K*) n J,,. 
Now since K* c Jo, K* satisfies the rules P *AQj, P -VQ,, and 
P - -,Q. And since K* G TN(K*), it follows from a comparison of Definitions 3.1 
and 3.2 with Definition 3.5 that K* satisfies the rules P e7Q and P =[Q * R]. 
Clearly, K* is the largest set of substates s 2 sO with these properties. 0 
Note that the first part of this theorem could be based on a model union property, 
analogous to Lemma 2.7, without reference to the fixed-point construction in the 
second part of the theorem. However, the proof of Lemma 2.7 and the analogous 
proof of the model union property are similar to the first part of the proof of the 
Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem [25], and there appears to be no reason to 
separate these two results in this case. 
Let us now return to the problem of entailment for negations and embedded 
implications, which we began to discuss in Section 3.1. Recall that we were looking 
for the largest set in P(B) that satisfies all the rules in 9 simultaneously, but we 
have now found such a set, K*, by Theorem 3.7. Clearly, every substate s 2 sO that 
satisfies the known constraints on our world is a member of K*, and every substate s 
in K* satisfies all the known constraints. This means that the concept of entailment 
in Definition 2.1 can be reinterpreted, for a set of rules including negations and 
embedded implications, to read as follows: A ground instance A is entailed by sO 
and 9%’ if and only if A ES for every s E K*. Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 can be 
reinterpreted in the same way: The formula (3x)P(x) is entailed by sO and .9? if and 
only if, for every s E K*, there exists a ground substitution B such that P(x)B ES. 
The formula (3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by sO and W if and only if there exists a 
ground substitution 0 such that, for every s E K*, P(x)8 E s. Alternatively, we can 
interpret Theorem 3.7 in terms of Kripke models: It is easy to see that K* is the 
unique maximal Kripke model for the set of rules .%? among all the sets J c B. The 
set K* thus plays a role in the theory of clausal intuitionistic logic that is similar to 
the role of the set G in the theory of Horn-clause logic. 
Despite this close analogy to the fixed-point semantics for Horn-clause logic, 
there is an important difference. Let us consider, by analogy to Lemma 2.11 and 
Theorem 2.12, the successive applications of T(J) = T,(J) n Jo to the top element of 
the lattice [9’(B), c]. We first prove the following: 
Lemma3.8. fl{Tk(B)]k<w}=fl{T&(JO)]k<w}. 
PROOF. We note several facts about the transformation TN. First, by Definition 3.5, 
TN(J) c J for any set J. Second, by monotonicity, T&{J,}) c fl{ T,(J,)} for any 
finite collection of sets {Ji}. Finally, since B 2 Jo, TN(B) a T,(J,) by monotonicity, 
and thus T&(B) 2 Tk(J,) for all k by induction. 
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These facts are sufficient for the proof of the lemma. We first establish the 
inequality in the lemma from right to left, using the following inequalities for 
Tk(B): 
T(B) = T,(B) ~J,z TN(JO) nJ,= r,(J,), 
T’(B) = T(T(B)) 2 T(T,(J,,)) = 7’;(J,) n J,,= T;(J,), 
Tk(B) = T(Tk-‘(B)) 2 T(7’;-‘(J,,)) = 7’;(J,) n J,= T;(J,). 
Thus n{Tk(B) 1 k < o} 2 n{ Z-;(J,,) 1 k < a}. 
We now establish the inequality in the lemma from left to right, using the 
following inequalities for Tk(B): 
T(B) = r,(B) n Jo, 
T2(B) = T,(T,(B) n J,,) n J, c T*(B) f7 T,(J,) n J,, 
Tk(B) c T;(B) n Tr?-‘(Jr,) n . . . n J,. 
Thus 
n{Tk(B)lk<w} ~fl{Tk(B) n Tk-l(J,,) n ... nJ,lk < U} 
=fl{7’~(B)n7’N(T~-1(Jo))n -.- nTN(J,,)lk<w} 
=fl{~;(B)nT;(J,)lk<o} 
=n{Ttj(J,)(k<w}, 
and the proof of the lemma is complete. •I 
For convenience, we now define J, = fl{Tk(B) ) k < CA} = fl{ rk(J,) 1 k -C CO}. 
Then, by analogy to Theorem 2.12, we would like to show that K* = J,. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. To see this, let us extend the iterations of 
Tk(B) through all ordinals (Y. If cx = j3 + 1 is a successor ordinal, we will define 
T”(B) = T(Tp(B)), and if cx is a limit ordinal, we will define T”(B) = fl{TB(B) 1 
p < a}. The following result is well known: 
Theorem 3.9. Let K* be the greatest jixed point of the monotonic transformation T on 
the complete lattice [9(B), ~1. Then there exists an ordinal (Y of cardinality less 
than or equal to the cardinality of 9(B) such that K* = T”(B). 
PROOF. See [ll, pp. 249-2501 or [9, pp. 210-2131. q 
However, unless the transformation T is continuous, we have no assurance that 
this result is true for T”(B) = fl{Tk(B) ) k < o }. Consider the analogue of Lemma 
2.11, with join continuity replaced by meet continuity. Although we can easily show 
that 
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for any descending chain I, 2 I, 2 I, 2 . . . in B(B), the proof of the opposite 
inequality in Lemma 2.11 will fail when applied to the operator T(J) = TN(J) n JO. 
This means that the first half of the proof of Theorem 2.12 will also fail, and we will 
only be able to prove the following: 
Lemma 3.10. K* c fl{Tk(B) 1 k < w} = fl{ rk(J,) 1 k < o}. 
PROOF. K* C B. Thus K* = T(K*) c T(B), by the fixed-point property and the 
monotonicity of T. Thus, by induction, K* c Tk(B) for all k. 0 
The inequality in the opposite direction will not, in general, be true. Indeed, in 
Example 3.19 below, we will see that K* = TW+l(B), but K* is only a proper subset 
of T“(B). The situation is thus reminiscent of the situation analyzed in [l], except 
that Apt and van Emden were there discussing the transformation T(s) = sa U T’(s) 
applied to the top element of the lattice [B, I], instead of the transformation 
T(J) = r,(J) f’ JO applied to the top element of the lattice [P(B), c]. 
3.3. The Model Intersection Property 
Although we have just shown that our analogy to the fixed-point semantics for 
Horn-clause logic fails in one important respect, there is another important compo- 
nent of the analogy, the model intersection property, which is valid. Recall that this 
property holds for the set G consisting of all the substates s L sO that satisfy the 
rules P - AQ, and P eVQj. In our analysis of the negation and embedded 
implication rules, we have constructed various subsets of G, and we will now show 
that the model intersection property holds for all of these subsets as well. We will do 
this in a series of lemmas, culminating in a proof that the model intersection 
property holds for the set K*. In all of these lemmas, we will assume that the 
relevant sets are nonempty. This assumption was not necessary in the Horn-clause 
case, since the set G always contains the top element of the lattice [B, I]. 
Lemma 3.11. Assume JO is nonempty. Then for any nonempty set J, 
JcJO * l--lJ~Ja. 
PROOF. Consider the set { llJ} U J. We will show that this set is a subset of G and 
that it satisfies the rules P 3 7Q. W e k now from Lemma 2.7 that flJ E G, and 
thus { fl J} u J c G. We also know that every s E J c JO satisfies the rules P * 7Q, 
by the definition of JO, and so it suffices to show that nJ satisfies these rules as 
well. Assume then that P(x)/3 E n J for some selected negation rule P(x) - 7Q(x; y) 
and for some ground substitution 8. Since llJ is a lower bound of J, P(x)6 E s for 
every s E J, and since J satisfies the negation rule P(x) - -,Q(x; y), it follows that 
Q(x; y)B’ 4 s’ for every s’ E J and for every 8’ 2 8. Since J is nonempty, this means 
that Q(x; y)O’ 66 nJ for every 8’ 2 0, and we conclude that the set { llJ} u J 
satisfies the negation rule P(x) - 7Q(x; y). Since the selected rule P - 7Q was 
arbitrary, it follows that { nJ} u J satisfies all rules of this form. 
We have thus shown that { nJ} U J is a subset of G satisfying the negation rules 
P 3 -Q. Since JO is, by definition, the union of all sets for which this is true, it 
follows that f’lJ E J,,. 0 
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Lemma 3.12. Assume Tk(J,) is nonempty. Then for any nonempty set J, 
J c T:f(J,) = llJ E T;(J,). 
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the exponent k. The case k = 0 is given by 
Lemma 3.11. Let us then assume that the proposition is true for Tk(J,) and 
consider any nonempty J c Tk”(J,). F rom the definition of TN we know that 
J G Tk(J,,), and from our induction assumption we know that nJ E Th(J,). We 
therefore need to show that nJ is preserved by the application of TN to Tk(J,,). 
Assume first that there exists a negation rule P e7Q and a ground substitution 8 
restricted to U( llJ) such that Q(x; y)O’ 4 s’ for all s’ 2 llJ in T&(J,) and for all 
8’ > 13. Consider this same negation rule applied to an arbitrary substate s E J. It is 
clear that Q(x; y)8’ P s’ for all s’ 2 s in Ti(J,) and for all 6’ r 0, and thus s will be 
preserved by the application of TN to TA(J,) only if P(x)f?Es. But we already 
know that s is preserved by the application of TN to Tk(J,), because s E J c 
Tk+‘(J,). From this analysis, then, we can conclude that P(x)0 E s for all s E J and 
thus P(x)8 E llJ. For the embedded implication rules P =[Q * R] the analysis is 
identical. Since these results hold for all the rules involved in Definition 3.5, it is 
clear that n J is itself preserved by the application of TN to Tk(J,). In other words, 
llJ E T$+‘(J,). 0 
Lemma 3.13. Assume J, = fl(Tk(J,) ) k < w } is nonempty. Then for any nonempty 
set J, 
J z J, - l-lJEJ_,. 
PROOF. Assume J c J,. Then for every k, J _C Ti(J,) and thus ilJ E T;(J,) by 
Lemma 3.12. But this means that llJ E J,. 0 
Lemma 3.14. Assume K* is nonempty. Then for any nonempty set J, 
JcK* * nJ E K*. 
PROOF. The proof is by transfinite induction. By Theorem 3.9, there exists some 
ordinal (Y of cardinality less than or equal to the cardinality of B(B) such that 
K* = T”(B). It therefore suffices to prove that the following proposition: 
JcT*(B) * llJETa(B) 
is true for all ordinals cx. 
For the case OL = W, the proposition is true by Lemma 3.8 and Lemma 3.13, and 
we can use this fact as the basis of the induction. Assume, then, that the proposition 
is true for all transfinite ordinals p < (Y. If LY is a limit ordinal, then the proposition 
can be proven true for (Y by the same argument used in Lemma 3.13. Specifically, 
assume that 
J c T*(B) = f-l{ Tp(B) (p < a}. 
Then llJ E TB(B) for all p by the induction hypothesis, and it follows that 
n J E T”(B). Alternatively, if cu = p + 1 is a successor ordinal, assume that 
J G T”(B) = T(TB(B)) = TN(TB(B)) n JO, 
and apply the argument used in Lemma 3.12. Since J c TB(B), we know from the 
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induction hypothesis that llJ E Tp(B), and we need to show that llJ is preserved 
by the application of TN to Tp(B). But this fact follows exactly as in the proof of 
Lemma 3.12. Thus llJ E TN(TB(B)). Also, since J c Jr,, we know from Lemma 3.11 
that llJ E J,. Thus llJ E T”(B), and the proof of the lemma is complete. q 
Note the assumption in Lemma 3.14 that K* is nonempty. If K* were empty, of 
course, there would be no substates in B that satisfy s,, and W. Thus the statement 
that K* is nonempty is a way of saying, semantically, that the initial substate sa and 
the rules 9 are mutually consistent. 
The following theorem now follows as a trivial consequence of the preceding 
lemmas: 
Theorem 3.15. Let T&(J,) denote the kth successive application of TN to J,, and let 
J, =W’i%JoW < w }. Let K* be the greatest fixed point of the transformation 
T(J) = T,(J) I? J,. If K* is nonempty, then 
nTi(Jo) E Tk(Jo) forall k<w, 
t-lJ,EJm, 
nK* EK*. 
Furthermore, 
llK*r l-lJ,> U{ llT;(J,)lk<w}. 
PROOF. Obvious, from Lemma 3.10 and Lemmas 3.11 through 3.14. q 
The situation is illustrated in Figure 3. The most important part of this theo- 
rem is the claim that llK* E K*. We have shown in Theorem 3.7 that K* is 
the largest subset of B that satisfies the rules in 9, and we now see that K* 
itself contains a unique minimal substate nK*. As a result, we see that en- 
tailment according to Definition 2.2 implies uniform entailment according to 
FIGURE 3. Successive applications of TN to 4. 
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Definition 2.3, exactly as in the Horn-clause case: 
Corollary 3.16. Let sO be a (possibly injinite) initial substate in B, and let 9 be a 
(possibly infinite) set of rules including negations and embedded implications. If 
(3x)P(x) is entailed by s,, and .%‘, then (3x)P(x) is uniformly entailed by sO and 2’. 
PROOF. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Corollary 2.10. Assume that 
(3x)P(x) is entailed by s0 and 9, Then, since nK* E K*, there must exist some 
ground substitution 0 such that P(x)8 E llK*. But this means that P(x)8 ES for 
every s E K*. q 
This result is not new: It follows directly from the early results of Harrop [lo] 
and Kleene [12], since the rules 9 satisfy Harrop’s condition insuring that a closed 
formula contains no positive occurrences of disjunctions or existential quantifiers. 
However, the theorems of Harrop and Kleene were established by proof-theoretic 
techniques, using a Gentzen-style proof system for intuitionistic logic, and our 
derivation of this result from a fixed-point construction in the semantics appears to 
be novel. 
The importance of this result lies in its similarity to Corollary 2.10 for Horn-clause 
logic. As a practical matter, Corollary 3.16 shows that any successful query ‘P(x)?’ 
in a set of rules including negations and embedded implications has a definite 
answer substitution for the variables x. Clearly, this would not be the case if the 
negation and embedded implication rules were interpreted classically. For example, 
the rule P(x) = 7Q(x; y) would be classically equivalent to the formula (vx)[ P(x) V 
(3y)Q(x;y)], which certainly does not have a unique minimal model, and a query 
‘(3x)P(x)?’ might be classically entailed by these rules without having a definite 
answer substitution for the variables x. In this sense, then, clausal intuitionistic logic 
is the more natural generalization of Horn-clause logic, as demonstrated by Theo- 
rem 3.15 and Corollary 2.10. 
However, the implications of Theorem 3.15 for the proof of a completeness 
theorem are not so favorable. Consider the inequality in the last line of this theorem. 
Let us suppose, in a particular case, that this inequality is actually an equality. This 
would then give us a simple way to compute the ground instances in nK*, in the 
same way we computed the ground instances in g* = nG. Under this assumption, 
if P(x)0 E nK*, then P(x)6 would be a member of U { n Tk(J,) 1 k 5 n} for some 
finite n, and we could compute P(x)0 explicitly by applying TN to J,, a finite 
number of times. We would thus have the foundations of a constructive complete- 
ness proof for the negation and embedded implication rules, analogous to the 
constructive completeness proof for the rules P =AQ., and P -VQ, in Theorem 
2.14. Unfortunately, the inequality in Theorem 3.15 is, m general, just an inequality, 
for essentially the same reasons that the transformation T(J) = TN(J) n Jo is, in 
general, noncontinuous. The counterexamples are discussed in Section 3.4 below. 
This means that the proof of a completeness theorem for a system of rules including 
negations and embedded implications will be much more complicated than the 
proof of a completeness theorem in the pure Horn-clause case. 
3.4. Examples 
We will now analyze three examples of the fixed-point semantics for clausal 
intuitionistic logic. Example 3.17 is well behaved: The sequence Jo, TN(Jo), 
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T;(J,,), . . . > converges in order w to the fixed point K*. This example will also be 
used in Section 4.1 to illustrate the proof procedures for our system. However, as we 
have pointed out, this convergence property does not hold in all cases. Examples 
3.18 and 3.19 are pathological: In these cases, the inequalities in Lemma 3.10 and 
Theorem 3.15 are strict inequalities. We will discuss the reasons for this behavior at 
the end of the section. 
Example 3.17. We will analyze here the interaction of four negation rules, two of 
them abstraction rules and two of them expansion rules. Assume that %’ consists of 
the following: 
C(x)--Qi(x. Y)? (13) 
P*(x) * ~Qz(x, Y)> (14) 
Qk Y> * a(% J’, z>, (15) 
Q,(x, _~+=4b, Y, z), 06) 
and assume that the initial substate s0 = { P2( a)}. Since there are no Horn clauses 
in this set, G simply consists of all substates containing ‘PI(a)‘, and g* = flG = 
{P2(a)>. 
To construct the set J,,, we must analyze the effect of the expansion rules (14) and 
(15). Because of the rule (14), all substates containing ‘Q,(a, y)’ will be deleted 
from J,, for any instantiation of the variable y. Because of the rule (15) there are 
certain substates greater than the substates containing ‘Q,( a, y)’ that will also be 
deleted from J,, for any instantiation of the variable y. For example, if s is a 
substate containing ‘Q,(u, b),’ then all substates s’ r s that contain ‘R(a, b, z)’ 
would be deleted from J,. for any instantiation of the variable z. Note at this point 
that nJ, is still equal to {P,(a)}. 
We now apply TN to J,, and we focus our attention on any substate s E J, 
containing ‘Q,(a, b).’ The relevant rule is (16). We know from our construction of 
J, that there are no substates s’ 2 s that contain ‘R( a, 6, z)‘, for any instantiation of 
the variable z, and thus TN will delete s from J,, unless s also contains ‘Qz(a, b)‘, 
by (16). But this is impossible, since there are no substates in J,, that contain 
‘Q,( a, b)‘. Furthermore, since this same argument applies to any substate s E J, 
containing ‘Q,(cz, v)‘, for any instantiation of the variable y, it is clear that all such 
substates are deleted from J, by the application of TN. Note, however, that the 
initial substate s0 is preserved by the application of TN to J,, and thus llT,(J,) = 
{P*(a)). 
Finally, we consider the set J, = TN(J,,), and we apply TN once more to J,. The 
relevant rule is now (13). At this point, since there are no substates at all in J, that 
contain ‘Q,(a, y) for any instantiation of the variable y, the initial substate sO is 
itself deleted by TN, and all the substates that are preserved by TN must contain 
‘PI(a).’ We can now verify that the system has reached a fixed point, and that we 
have obtained the following solution: 
llK* = f-lT;(J,) = {P,(a), P,(a)}. 
In this case, of course, the inequality in the last line of Theorem 3.15 is actually an 
equality. 
Example 3.18. We will now analyze two counterexamples to the opposite in- 
equality in Theorem 3.15. We will first construct an example in which nJ, is 
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strictly greater than U { ll Ti(J,,) 1 k < w }. Assume that 9 consists of the following 
rules: 
p(+ lQ<x, Y), (17) 
R(x, Y) j lQ(x, y>> 08) 
Rhf(~))-Qb~ Y)> (19) 
and assume that sO is a specially constructed initial substate, which we define as 
follows: Let us write U/f for the set of all terms in U except for those terms that 
begin with the function symbol ‘f ‘. For example, the term ‘g( f(x), y)’ would 
be included in U/f, but the terms ‘f(g(f(x), Y))‘, ‘f(f(g(f(x), Y)))‘? 
‘f( f(f(g(f(x), y))))‘, and so on, would not be included in U/f. We then set 
sO= {‘R(a,term)‘ltermEU/f}, 
and we consider successive applications of TN to J,,. 
First, consider JO itself. For every term E U/f, and for every s E JO, it follows 
from rule (18) that ‘Q(u, term)’ P s. Thus, when we apply TN to JO, the rule (19) 
guarantees that every substate s E T,(J,) will contain ‘R( a, f(term))’ for every 
term E U/f. The rule (18) then assures us that ‘Q(u, f(term))’ G? s for every s E 
TN(JO), and so on. In general, by induction, if s E Th(J,), then s contains 
‘R(u, f&(term)) for every term E U/f. This means that U{ nTi(J,) 1 k < CJ} 
contains ‘R(u, term)‘, ‘R(u, f(term))‘, ‘R(u, f2(term))‘, ‘R(u, f3(term))‘, . . . , for all 
finite sequences of applications of the function symbol ‘f ‘. We now analyze the rule 
(17). Is the right-hand side of (17) ever satisfied on nTr!j(JO), for any k? The 
answer is negative, since there will always be some ground instance 
‘Q( a, fk”(term))’ remaining in some substate s in TA(J,). Thus, U{ flTi(&) 1 
k -C w } does not contain the ground instance ‘P(u)‘. 
Consider now an arbitrary substate s E J,. Since s E Tk(J,) for all k, it follows 
from our previous analysis that s contains ‘R(u, f“(term))’ for all k. But s is also a 
member of JO, and thus the rule (18) implies that, for all k, ‘Q(u, f“(term))’ @ s’ for 
all s’ 2 s in J,,. Is the ground instance ‘P(u)’ contained in s? Note that the set 
{ ‘fk(term)‘Iterm E U/f, k -c w} 
completely exhausts the set of terms in U, and thus the right-hand side of (17) 
would be satisfied on the substate s in JO. If we assume that ‘P(u)’ 4 s, then s 
would be deleted by the application of TN to JO, and this would contradict the 
assumption that s E J,. Thus ‘P(u)’ E s. Since s was chosen as an arbitrary 
substate in J,, however, it follows that ‘P(u)’ E llJ,. We have thus shown that 
llJ, is strictly greater than U { n Tk(J,) ) k -c a}. 
Example 3.19. We will now construct an example in which llK* is strictly 
greater than nJ,. Assume that 2’ consists of the following rules: 
p(x), -Qb, Y>? (20) 
R(x> Y) j lQ(x, y), (21) 
Q(x, f(r)) * lS(x, f(y)), (22) 
Qbt ~)(=lS(x>f(~)), (23) 
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and assume that s,, is the same initial substate constructed in Example 3.18: 
s,, = { ‘R( a, term)‘Iterm E U/j}. 
With these assumptions, we will show that TN(Jm) is strictly less than J,, so that J, 
cannot be a fixed point of TN_ This is therefore a counterexample to the opposite 
inequality in Lemma 3.10, as well as a counterexample to the opposite inequality in 
Theorem 3.15. 
Clearly, the initial analysis of Jo is identical to the analysis of J, in Example 3.18. 
In other words, for every term E U/f and for every s E J,, it follows from the rule 
(21) that ‘Q( a, term)’ P s. However, these rules allow the existence of a substate 
s E J,, for which ‘Q( a, f(term))’ E s, and we will focus our attention for the moment 
on such a substate s. By the rule (22), since ‘Q(a, f(term))’ E s, it follows that 
‘S(a, f(term))’ GZ s’ for all s’ 2 s in J,. Now apply TN to J,. By the rule (23), TN 
will delete the substate s unless s also contains ‘Q( a, term)‘, which is impossible by 
our initial analysis of J,. Thus, for every term E U/f, we see that there exists no 
substate s E T,(J,,) for which ‘Q(u, f(term))’ E s. By induction, we can now extend 
this analysis to an arbitrary Tk(J,). For every k, there will exist some substate 
s E T;(J,) such that ‘Q(u, fk”(term))’ E s, but ‘Q(u, fk(term))’ @ s for every 
substate s E T$(J,). 
We now claim that s0 E J,, but s0 P TN(Jm). To see this, examine any Tk(J,), 
and note that the right-hand side of (20) cannot be satisfied on nTk(J,), since 
there is always some substate in TA(J,) that contains ‘Q(u, fk+‘(term))‘. This 
means that the initial substate sO, which does not contain ‘P(u)‘, will always be 
preserved by successive applications of TN to J,. In other words, s0 E Tk(J,) for all 
k, and thus s0 E J,. On the other hand, for every k, there can be no substate in J, 
containing ‘Q(u, fk(term)),’ since every such substate is deleted by T$(J,). Thus, 
when we apply TN to J,, the rule (20) causes the deletion of s0 from TN(Jm). We 
have thus shown that J, cannot be a fixed point of TN. By Lemma 3.10, this means 
that K*, which is a fixed point of TN, must be a proper subset of J,, and that nK* 
must be strictly greater than llJ,. 
It should now be obvious why these counterexamples behave as they do. Since all 
the individual constants in U appear in the initial substate s,,, the abstraction and 
expansion rules working together eventually construct every term in the universe of 
discourse, and thus the right-hand side of the rule ‘P(u)e7Q(u, y)’ is eventually 
satisfied for every possible value of the universally quantified ‘y ’ variable. This 
result would not occur if U contained additional individual constants. In Section 
4.5, in fact, we will elevate this observation to the status of a theorem, and show that 
the inequality in Theorem 3.15 is actually an equality if there exists an infinite 
supply of individual constants in U that do not appear in sO. To do this, however, 
we need to develop a proof procedure for our system of clausal intuitionistic logic, 
and show that it is both sound and complete. This is the subject of the following 
section. 
NOTE. Sections 4, 5, and 6 will appear in the second paper of this pair. 
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